Les Affaires as 2026 accelerates

les affaires is now tied to a turning point in Canada’s defense strategy: a larger industrial base, faster military recruitment, and a growing debate over what must give way to pay for it all. Ottawa’s latest commitments are no longer abstract targets. They are beginning to show up in factories, hiring, and budget choices, with Quebec emerging as a key testing ground.

What Happens When defense spending becomes industrial policy?

Ottawa has set the pace by moving more than a billion dollars into projects on General Dynamics land in Salaberry-de-Valleyfield and Repentigny. The federal plan announced this week is expected to create more than 356 jobs in Quebec, with the largest share of investment going to a 155 mm projectile plant in Repentigny and additional facilities in Salaberry-de-Valleyfield.

The scale matters because it links military readiness to local economic activity. A $356 million investment will support a nitrocellulose plant in Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, with more than 40 permanent jobs expected, plus temporary hiring tied to construction and supply chains. Another $58 million will go toward a first Canadian plant for M231 and M232 charges used in 155 mm artillery shells, with at least 18 permanent positions and potentially up to 116 jobs once production is fully underway.

For Ottawa, this is more than procurement. It is a sign that defense industrial capacity is being treated as a sovereignty issue, not just a military one. les affaires is therefore being reshaped by the same logic that now guides the federal message: produce more at home, depend less on foreign suppliers, and turn defense demand into domestic capability.

What If recruitment and production rise together?

The current state of play suggests the government is moving on two fronts at once. On the industrial side, the defense budget has already expanded. The federal government added $9 billion to the Defense budget in 2025, bringing total spending to $63 billion. On the personnel side, recruitment is improving as the military modernizes its equipment.

One senior non-commissioned officer described 2026 as a particularly active year for recruitment. She pointed to a new electronic portal that lets candidates submit applications more quickly from home, and she said candidacies in Quebec have risen by 26% since February 5. Recruiters are also being kept busy in Montreal, Rimouski, Quebec City, Chicoutimi, and Sherbrooke, with promising figures in Quebec and Montreal in particular.

That matters because hardware without personnel does not deliver full capacity. The average candidate age is 26, and training is paid, with several trades linked directly to civilian employment. In other words, the pipeline is being built to serve both defense needs and future labor-market mobility.

What If the fiscal cost forces hard trade-offs?

This is where the story becomes harder. One policy institute says Ottawa will have to cut elsewhere to finance the defense push. Its analysis projects that reaching the 3. 5% military-capacity target by 2035 would push spending on that line from nearly $60 billion to a little over $160 billion. It also warns that, under a status quo approach to public finances, the deficit would widen over the next decade.

That same analysis says the federal deficit could reach $117 billion in 2035 if current patterns hold. Separately, the Parliamentary Budget Officer estimated in February that defense spending alone could add $63 billion to the deficit in 2035-2036, equal to 1. 4% of GDP.

The suggested response is not one single cut but a series of difficult choices: slower growth in transfers to seniors and provinces, deeper restraint in operating spending, and a stronger push to remove barriers to investment. The risks are clear. Such changes could irritate provinces, unsettle older Canadians, and require several years of spending discipline. Yet even then, the numbers do not fully close the gap.

What If 2026 becomes the model for the next decade?

There are three plausible paths from here. In the best case, defense production ramps up smoothly, recruitment keeps improving, and the federal government finds enough fiscal room through stronger growth and tighter spending discipline. In the most likely case, Quebec continues to gain jobs and contracts, while Ottawa manages a gradual and politically difficult reordering of priorities. In the most challenging case, industrial delays or fiscal pressures slow the buildout, and the promised defense expansion collides with rising deficits and provincial resistance.

For stakeholders, the winners are clear: Quebec communities near the new plants, job seekers entering a modernized recruitment system, and defense planners seeking more domestic supply. The likely losers are less obvious but just as important: provinces facing slower transfers, seniors who could see weaker benefit growth, and departments competing for budget space in a tighter federal environment.

What readers should understand is that les affaires is no longer only about procurement or jobs; it is about the trade-off between security capacity and fiscal capacity. The shift is already underway, but its limits are still being tested. The next stage will depend on whether Ottawa can keep industrial momentum, sustain recruitment, and make the hard choices needed to finance both without letting the deficit do the deciding. les affaires