The KAAN “Trap”: Turkey’s ‘Indigenous’ Fighter Requires Permission, Lacks Power

The Turkish KAAN fighter jet program has gained attention as Turkey attempts to establish itself among the ranks of fifth-generation air powers. Despite its ambitious marketing, the KAAN faces significant challenges, particularly regarding its power source and dependence on foreign supply chains.

The KAAN Fighter Jet Program Overview

First taking to the skies in February 2024, the KAAN has flown successfully for over 15 minutes and continues to undergo testing. The goal of the program is to deliver approximately 20 “Block 10” units to the Turkish Air Force by 2028 or 2029, with plans for serial production set for the 2030s. However, a closer look reveals underlying issues concerning its production and operation.

Dependency on U.S. Engines

• The KAAN fighters rely on the U.S.-manufactured General Electric F110 engine.
• Under CAATSA sanctions, Turkey must secure a U.S. export license to produce and maintain these engines.

Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s foreign minister, acknowledged in September 2025 that the F110 license approval is stalled in Congress. This predicament poses a crucial barrier to the production of the KAAN.

Domestic Engine Development Efforts

Turkey is endeavoring to overcome its reliance on U.S. engines. TEI and TRMotor are working on the TF-35000, a domestic turbofan engine, expected to undergo ground testing in the mid-2020s, with integration aimed for 2032. However, challenges in engine development may hinder this timeline.

Market Implications and Geopolitical Risks

Indonesia has emerged as a potential first buyer, signing an agreement for 48 KAAN aircraft worth approximately $10 billion. However, the dependence on U.S. engines complicates operational logistics, as Washington would control maintenance and upgrade schedules, affecting both Turkey and any foreign buyers.

Furthermore, Turkey’s geopolitical relationships, particularly with the United States and Europe, remain tense. Issues surrounding the S-400 missile system, conflicts in Syria, and NATO dynamics add layers of complexity that could influence the KAAN’s supply chain and delivery schedules.

Broader Defense Strategy

Turkey is not solely relying on the KAAN for its defense needs. Alongside the KAAN, Ankara is acquiring Eurofighter Typhoons and negotiating for F-16 Block 70s. These additional acquisitions indicate a strategy of diversification in air power capabilities, reflecting a cautious approach within the Turkish defense sector.

Conclusion: The Future of the KAAN

The KAAN highlights Turkey’s ambition to develop an indigenous fifth-generation fighter jet. While Turkey is committed to this project, external factors such as engine licensing and international relations will play a significant role in its future viability.

Foreign investors considering the KAAN must weigh the risks of entrusting their defense capabilities to a program dependent on external approvals. Until Turkey secures complete operational autonomy, the KAAN will remain a project heavily reliant on permission rather than inherent power.