Ali Khalilov was sentenced in March 2026 in Riga to 11 years in prison for a Starlink smuggling scheme tied to the Caucasus and Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. The case centred on 60 Starlink Mini Kits worth about €200,000 and showed how sanctioned technology can still move through regional trade routes.
Four men faced charges in Riga for organising the purchase and transportation of the kits to support Russia’s military operations in Ukraine and for violating international sanctions. Khalilov, an Azerbaijani citizen residing in Riga, was also given three years’ probation, deportation from Latvia, and a five-year re-entry ban.
Riga court and Ali Khalilov
Khalilov was the main organiser of the scheme. The sentence turned a cross-border supply chain into a criminal case with direct personal penalties: 11 years in prison, probation, deportation from Latvia, and a five-year re-entry ban.
The value attached to the shipment was around €200,000. That figure, paired with the 60 Starlink Mini Kits, is what makes the case operationally important: it was not a one-off private purchase, but a coordinated transfer of sanctioned equipment meant to reach Russia during the fourth year of Moscow’s full-scale war against Ukraine.
EU export ban and route
The EU had banned the export of Starlink Mini Kits to Russia because the devices provided satellite internet access in remote areas and had strategic military use in Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. Yet 60 kits were still allegedly purchased and transported through third-country networks linked to the South Caucasus.
That friction between the ban and the shipment is the point of the case. Sanctions stop direct sale, but they do not stop every resale path: a buyer, a transporter, and a route through Europe and the South Caucasus can still connect a prohibited product to Russia if each handoff is separated enough from the original sale.
South Caucasus trade networks
Alexander Kupatadze said Georgia’s number one export item was used cars even before the war, and that this trade has since been reoriented toward facilitating the delivery of sanctioned Western-produced vehicles to Russia. Kupatadze also said Armenia has long had a specific niche in the gold and jewelry trade.
“For example, Georgia’s number one export item was used cars even before the war, and this trade has since been reoriented toward facilitating the delivery of sanctioned Western-produced vehicles to Russia. Armenia has long had a specific niche in the gold and jewelry trade, which has similarly been repurposed in the context of sanctions evasion” — Alexander Kupatadze.
Erica Marat added that Armenia has emerged as a pivotal intermediary for illegal re-exporting Russian gold and jewelry, while Georgia has played a significant role in re-exporting Russian oil and facilitating the delivery of automobiles to Russia, circumventing international sanctions. A study by Transparency International Georgia on Bidzina Ivanishvili’s network in Russia was cited as part of the explanation for business relationships involving his family members and other businesspeople in Russia.
“Armenia has emerged as a pivotal intermediary for illegal re-exporting Russian gold and jewelry, while Georgia has played a significant role in re-exporting Russian oil and facilitating the delivery of automobiles to Russia, circumventing international sanctions.” — Erica Marat.
The unanswered operational question is how exactly the Starlink Mini Kits moved from purchase to transport without being stopped. The Riga case shows that the route existed; Khalilov’s sentence shows Latvia acted after the fact.
