United States Navy power narrows as Iran closes Strait of Hormuz
Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz is the clearest example in the piece of how the united states navy can no longer guarantee freedom of navigation everywhere. The argument now turns on a narrower question: where U.S. sea power still protects trade, and where it no longer can.
The article says Iran used drones, mines, and cheap missiles to obstruct the strait, which has no maritime alternatives. That leaves commercial traffic dependent on a route the United States could not keep open in the way older naval doctrine assumed.
Raleigh and Mahan
Sir Walter Raleigh coined the maxim that “Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.” Alfred Thayer Mahan later popularized it, and the piece uses that idea to frame a long period when the United States relied on overwhelming naval power to sustain military dominance and secure global trade.
The article says that model has narrowed. U.S. forces still hold clear advantages on the high seas, but the text argues that advantage no longer translates into guaranteed control in every waterway that matters to trade or military movement.
Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb
Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz is paired with another example: Houthi forces kept the Bab el-Mandeb Strait closed to most traffic for all of 2024. The article says Russia and China secured safe passage for their own ships through that strait while the United States conducted a military campaign to weaken and dislodge the Houthi group.
Those two choke points are the piece’s practical test case. In one, Iran blocked traffic directly; in the other, a regional force limited passage while other powers found ways through. Together, they show a U.S. navy that can still fight but not automatically guarantee open seas.
East Asia and the Arctic
The article extends that argument beyond the Middle East. It says China’s rapid naval expansion and immense shipbuilding capacity have made uncontested U.S. maritime dominance increasingly unsustainable even outside choke points, and it names parts of East Asia and the Arctic as regions where U.S. freedom to maneuver is now limited.
In a contingency, the piece says U.S. warships could be prevented from approaching close to an adversary’s coast by powerful anti-ship missiles or underwater sea drones. That is the central operational constraint for readers watching trade security and military planning: the United States retains reach, but not the same ability to secure every lane on demand.
